Pace Environmental Law Review Online Companion
Volume 5
Issue 1 Twenty-Sixth Annual Jeffrey G. Miller
Pace National Environmental Law Moot Court
Competition

Article 3

March 2014

Measuring Brief
Harley Carmer
S.J. Quinney School of Law

John Robinson Jr.
S.J. Quinney School of Law

Douglas Naftz
S.J. Quinney School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Natural
Resources Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Harley Carmer, John Robinson Jr., and Douglas Naftz, Measuring Brief, 5 Pace Envtl. L. Rev.
Online Companion 49 (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review Online Companion by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL
JEFFREY G. MILLER PACE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
Measuring Brief*
S. J. QUINNEY SCHOOL OF LAW
HARLEY CARMER, JOHN ROBINSON, JR., DOUGLAS NAFTZ

CA. No. 155–CV–2012 & 165–CV–2012 (Consolidated)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
JACQUES BONHOMME,
Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee
v.
SHIFTY MALEAU,
Defendant-Appellant
STATE OF PROGRESS,
Plaintiff-appellant, Cross-Appellee
and
SHIFTY MALEAU,
Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee
v.
JACQUES BONHOMME,
Defendant-Appellant
ON APPEAL FROM
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PROGRESS
Brief for JACQUES BONHOMME
This brief has been reprinted in its original format. Please note that the Table
of Authorities and Table of Contents for this brief have been omitted.
*

49

1

50 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 5

JURISDICTION

The parties below cross-alleged addition of pollutants to
navigable waters of the United States in violation of section 301
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
The Act grants district courts federal question jurisdiction
without regard to amount in controversy or diversity. 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a). The lower court’s final order dismissed the case and
Appellant Bonhomme filed a timely notice of appeal. Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(1)(A). This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §1291.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. Can a French national bring a citizen suit under the Clean
Water Act when a federal treaty guarantees French citizens equal
access to United States courts?
II. Does the fact that a third party might gain a tertiary
benefit from a lawsuit stop an individual who holds a substantive
right under federal law, like Bonhomme, from being a real party
in interest under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17?
III. Is Reedy Creek a “water of the United States” under the
Clean Water Act because it flows between two states and into a
federally-owned marsh?
IV. Does Clean Water Act jurisdiction extend to waters, like
Ditch C-1, that are relatively permanent and continuously
flowing tributaries of navigable interstate waters of the United
States?
V. Under the Clean Water Act, are piles of mining waste
point sources when they discharge pollutants from discernible
and discrete eroded channels into waters of the United States?
VI. Is Bonhomme liable under the Clean Water Act and its
implementing regulations when a culvert on his property simply
transfers already-polluted water into Reedy Creek?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case revolves around arsenic pollution, its entry into the
environment, and the proper assignment of responsibility under
the Clean Water Act. The arsenic originates in piles of mining
waste that defendant Maleau trucks from his mine to the site at
issue here. When it rains, the rainwater leaches arsenic out of the
uncovered piles of waste. The polluted water then flows into an
agricultural channel, makes its way into an interstate creek, and
eventually ends up in an important national wildlife refuge.
Bonhomme, the plaintiff below, filed this citizen suit in an
effort to clean up the arsenic-polluted waters that flow through
and near his property in Progress. Bonhomme wants Maleau to
control the pollution at its source through compliance with a
discharge permit under the Clean Water Act. The State of
Progress and Maleau filed a reciprocal suit countering that
Bonhomme should be responsible for cleaning up the arsenic just
because the polluted water happens to flow into Reedy Creek
through a culvert on his property.
The district court disposed of the case by granting Maleau’s
motion to dismiss. It determined that Bonhomme’s French
nationality means that he is not a “citizen” under the Clean
Water Act. It also found that Bonhomme is not a real party in
interest under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 because
Precious Metals International might gain some benefit from
Bonhomme’s success. Finally, the court stated that it would have
found for Maleau on all but one issue if the case had proceeded to
the merits.
Bonhomme appeals from the granted motion to dismiss
because his nationality is irrelevant to the Clean Water Act’s
citizen suit provision and his substantive rights under the Act
make him a de facto real party in interest. This Court ordered
additional briefing on the substantive merits of the case.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Shifty Maleau. Mr. Maleau owns and operates a gold mine
in Lincoln County, Progress. R. at 5. In the course of his business,
Maleau trucks overburden and slag from his mine to a separate
property in Jefferson County and piles the waste material there.
R. at 5. When it rains, the water flows over and through the piles,
leaching arsenic out of the waste material along the way. R. at 5.
Over time, the rain has eroded channels that empty the
contaminated water directly into Ditch C-1. R. at 5.
Ditch C-1. In 1913, a consortium of Progress landowners
built Ditch C-1 to drain their saturated soils for agricultural use.
R. at 5. From Maleau’s property, the Ditch runs three miles
through agricultural land before emptying into Reedy Creek. R.
at 5. It averages three feet wide by one foot deep. R. at 5. Along
the way, it gathers groundwater and surface water when it rains.
R. at 5. Ditch C-1 flows continuously except for short intervals of
drought. R. at 5. It terminates at Reedy Creek, emptying its
contents into the Creek through a culvert on Bonhomme’s land.
R. at 5.
Reedy Creek and Wildman Marsh. Reedy Creek flows for
fifty miles from New Union into Progress. R. at 5. It provides
water for commercial and agricultural use in both states. R. at 5.
The Creek runs past Bonhomme’s property and ends in Wildman
Marsh. R. at 5. The United States owns much of the extensive
wetlands in the Marsh, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
maintains the federal property and operates it as the Wildman
National Wildlife Refuge. R. at 6. The Refuge attracts many
hunters from across the nation and around the world. R. at 6. As
a hunting destination, the Refuge is a boon—it adds over $25
million to the local economy. R. at 6.
Jacques Bonhomme and the Arsenic Contamination.
Mr. Bonhomme is a French citizen, r. at 8, and President of
Precious Metals International (PMI). R. at 6. He owns land in
Progress that borders both Reedy Creek and Wildman Marsh,
and Ditch C-1 also flows through his property. R. at 5. A large
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lodge sits on his land near the Marsh and he uses it to go duck
hunting with both professional and personal guests. R. at 6.
Before filing suit, Bonhomme tested the waters around his
property. R. at 6. The tests show that Ditch C-1 contains no
arsenic before it reaches Maleau’s property, yet downstream from
his property tests show high concentrations of the poison. R. at 6.
On its way to the Reedy, the arsenic concentration drops
proportionately to the additional water gathered by the Ditch. R.
at 6.
Likewise, Reedy Creek contains no arsenic above the culvert
on Bonhomme’s property. R. at 6. Downstream of C-1’s discharge,
however, the Creek contains significant concentrations of arsenic.
R. at 6. Tests also show detectable levels of arsenic throughout
Wildman Marsh and in some of its wildlife. R. at 6. The arsenic
contamination forced Bonhomme to reduce the use of his property
by seventy-five percent. R. at 6.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This case arises under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2006) (Clean Water Act or CWA).
Appellant Bonhomme brought a CWA citizen suit against
Appellee Maleau because pollutants discharged from Maleau’s
property are continually degrading waters on and near
Bonhomme’s property. The district court dismissed his claim.
Bonhomme maintains that the district court erred in all but one
of its holdings below. The court correctly found that Reedy Creek
is a “water of the United States,” and this Court should affirm.
With respect to the remaining five issues, this Court should
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The district court dismissed Bonhomme’s suit, holding that
he is not a real party in interest under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(a). The court incorrectly reasoned that Bonhomme
was not a real party in interest simply because a third party
might gain benefit from his success. Further, the district court
determined that the CWA’s citizen suit provision only applies to
United States citizens, thus precluding Bonhomme, a French
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national, from bringing his suit. In light of a bilateral United
States treaty with France that grants French citizens full access
to U.S. courts, Bonhomme’s nationality has no bearing on his
ability to maintain suit. Even without the treaty, a plain reading
of “citizen” in the Act shows that the lower court’s determination
was wrong.
Second, the district court properly concluded that Reedy
Creek, an interstate water with direct ties to interstate commerce
and a federal wildlife preserve, was a “navigable water” under the
CWA. But, its interrelated jurisdictional determination regarding
Ditch C-1 was incorrect. The district court facially determined
that, simply because Ditch C-1 is called a “ditch” and merges with
Reedy Creek via a culvert, the Ditch is a point source. However,
the court’s reasoning and conclusion are flawed. The Ditch is a
tributary to a water of the United States that is permanent,
maintains a constant flow for the majority of the year, and
significantly affects the chemical and biological integrity of
interstate waters. Thus, under both Supreme Court precedent
and agency interpretation of that precedent, the Ditch is a “water
of the United States,” not a point source.
Finally, the lower court concluded that Maleau’s mining
waste piles are not point sources under the CWA. Further, it
decided that Bonhomme, not Maleau, is violating the Act because
the arsenic passes through Bonhomme’s culvert on its way to
Reedy Creek. The court was wrong on both counts. Under
existing case law, the mining piles are definitively point sources
because they discharge pollutants into Ditch C-1, a water of the
United States, through eroded channels that constitute
discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances. Additionally,
recent EPA rulemaking codifies that Bonhomme cannot be liable
for CWA violations in this situation—Maleau’s waste piles add
arsenic into the Ditch first, so Bonhomme cannot re-add it
because it is already in the water. Because the court
misinterpreted the nature of the Ditch, it follows that its related
point source conclusions are also incorrect. In light of the lower
court’s incorrect conclusions, Appellant Bonhomme requests that
this Court reverse the motion to dismiss and remand his case for
further proceedings.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

To withstand a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). On
review of a granted motion to dismiss, this Court accepts the
complaint’s well-pleaded allegations as true and reviews the
district court’s decision de novo. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d
163, 169 (2d Cir. 2012).

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY
DISMISSED BONHOMME’S CLAIM BECAUSE
FEDERAL LAW ENTITLES HIM TO BRING SUIT
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S CITIZEN SUIT
PROVISION.

Bonhomme’s French nationality is irrelevant to his right to
relief under the Clean Water Act. Under the broad citizen suit
provision at section 505 of the CWA, any individual may seek
judicial enforcement against anyone “alleged to be in violation of
[the Act].” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2006). Indeed, the Supreme
Court recognizes “that the obvious purpose of [citizen suit
provisions] is to encourage enforcement by so-called ‘private
attorneys general.’” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997). To
that end, Congress opened citizen suit standing “to the full extent
permitted under Article III.” Id. at 165 (comparing environmental
citizen suit provisions to the expansive standing granted by the
Civil Rights Act). This expansive grant of standing comports with
Congress’s lofty policy goals and fits nicely with the CWA’s other
sweeping concepts.
However, the district court contravened Congress when it
determined that Bonhomme’s French nationality precluded his
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suit. It denied itself subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case,
thereby improperly restricting the breadth and purpose of the
citizen suit provision. It erred for two reasons. First, the United
States signed a bilateral treaty with France guaranteeing French
citizens the same access to federal courts as U.S. citizens. Second,
even absent the treaty, the citizen suit provision’s only
jurisdictional restriction is based on harm, not nationality.
A. The Convention of Establishment grants French
nationals the same access to courts that United
States citizens enjoy.
Under Federal law, United States courts must grant
Bonhomme the same rights and privileges as United States
citizens. According to the Constitution, “all treaties . . . shall be
the supreme law of the land” and “bind the United States . . . and
the courts as well.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Medellin v. Texas,
552 U.S. 491, 543 (2008).
In 1959, President Eisenhower negotiated the Convention of
Establishment Between the United States of America and
France. Nov. 25, 1959, 11 U.S.T. 2398, attached at App’x A. The
Senate ratified the treaty and it went into effect at the end of
1960. Id. It remains in effect. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaties in
Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of
the
United
States
93
(2012),
available
at
http://perma.cc/04ZAzdPZFQu.
The United States negotiated the Convention to “strengthen[]
the ties of peace and friendship” and to “encourag[e] closer
economic intercourse” between the two countries. 11 U.S.T. at
2399. The treaty speaks directly to that goal and is dispositive on
this issue; Bonhomme can bring suit under the Clean Water Act.
Article III of the treaty states: “Nationals and companies of either
[country] shall be accorded national treatment with respect to
access to the courts of justice . . . within the territories of the
other [country], . . . both in pursuit and in defense of their rights.”
Id. at 2401.
The Convention of Establishment is the supreme law of the
land and is self-executing. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 571–72
(listing self-executing treaties). It guarantees French citizens
equal access to U.S. courts, yet the district court dismissed
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Bonhomme’s citizen suit because of his French nationality.
Therefore, this Court must reverse the lower court.
B. Even if the treaty did not apply, the Clean Water
Act’s plain language, supported by legislative
history, grants a cause of action to anyone adversely
affected by an effluent violation.
The plain language of section 505 is clear: A person’s
nationality has no bearing on her ability to bring suit under the
Clean Water Act. Here, a plain reading of the entire citizen suit
provision shows that the only restriction on who may bring a suit
hinges on whether that person suffered an adverse effect. Placing
the Act’s definition of “citizen” in proper context illustrates
Congress’s clarity:
(g) Any “person or persons”
that have
(g) “an interest” which is “adversely affected”
may bring
(a) “a civil action on his own behalf.”
33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), (g). In short, nationality plays no role.
Courts must “give effect to the intent of Congress,” and the
best way to do that is to follow the “plain and unambiguous
meaning” of the statute. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
340 (1997). And when the plain language is clear, “that is the end
of the matter.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841 (1984). Hence, nationality is irrelevant,
Congressional intent is clear, and the plain meaning controls.
Presuming that Congress said what it meant and section 505
means what it says, the only possible conclusion is that
Bonhomme is a “citizen” for purposes of the Clean Water Act.
Because the plain meaning is unambiguous, judicial inquiry is
complete. But even if the statute’s plain language did not end the
inquiry, the district court’s improper addition of a United States
nationality requirement to the statute fails for two reasons. First,
the court added words to the statute and used the wrong
definition of “citizen.” Second, the court contravened
congressional intent.

9
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The district court made its first mistake when it added
language to the statute. Without inquiry or justification, the court
determined explicitly that the single word “citizen” actually
means “citizen of the United States.” R. at 8. But, courts may not
add, delete, or distort Congress’s words because “[a]fter all,
Congress expresses its purpose by words.” 62 Cases of Jam v.
United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951). The district court’s
modification of the CWA’s language did just that; it added words
and thereby distorted the provision’s meaning.
Not only did it add words, but the lower court’s narrow
interpretation also ignored the dictionary definition of citizen: “A
person who, by either birth or naturalization, is a member of a
political community.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009);
accord Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“a member of a
state”). Hence, “citizen” is a broad and generic term unless
specifically restricted to a certain place. This distinction is
precisely why we say that a person is a citizen of somewhere when
that is what we mean. Bonhomme is indeed a citizen—a citizen of
France. If Congress had meant to add “of the United States” as a
modifier to “citizen,” it surely would have done so—as it has in
many other statutes. E.g., 46 U.S.C. § 12103 (2006) (“An
individual who is a citizen of the United States”); 18 U.S.C. § 911
(2006) (“. . . represents himself to be a citizen of the United
States”) (emphases added). (A strict search for the term “citizen of
the United States” returns 1,046 results within West’s United
States Code Annotated.)
Second, the district court ignored the Clean Water Act’s
legislative history. Indeed, the CWA arose in direct response to
“an almost total lack of enforcement” under the old state-centric
regime. S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3672, attached at App’x B. As a result of that failure,
Congress recognized that an “essential element in any control
program involving the nation’s waters is public participation.” Id.
at 3738 (emphasis added). Part of that recognition involved
allowing individuals to act as so-called private attorneys general.
“[I]f the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their
enforcement responsibility, the public is provided the right to
seek vigorous enforcement” under section 505. Id. at 3730
(emphasis added). In fact, the first sentence describing citizen
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suits states: “Anyone may initiate a civil suit against any person
who is alleged to be in violation of an effluent limitation.” Id. at
3744 (emphasis added).
Anyone. The public. These are the words Congress used to
explain the CWA’s citizen suit provision. They are not limiting
words; they are not geographical terms. The district court
distorted Congress’s intent by relying on a single off-topic case to
support the proposition that, when Congress defined “citizen” as
“a person or persons,” all it did was expand possible plaintiffs
from “individuals” to “various entities.” R. at 8. In so doing, the
district court relied on inapposite case law and compared
complicated navigability doctrine to the straight-forward concept
of citizenship. “Navigable waters” is a complex concept and also a
term of art; “citizen” is neither. This Court should reverse and
remand.
II. BONHOMME IS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
UNDER RULE 17 BECAUSE HE HOLDS THE
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO ENFORCE WATER
QUALITY STANDARDS UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT.
The fact that Precious Metals International might benefit
from Bonhomme’s suit has no bearing on whether Bonhomme is a
real party in interest under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17.
The purpose of the rule is to ensure that the “plaintiff has a
significant interest in the particular action” and also “possesses
the right to enforce the claim.” Frommert v. Conkright, 535 F.3d
111, 120 (2d Cir. 2008); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 1973).
Therefore, the touchstone real-party inquiry looks at the
underlying cause of action: “the ‘real party in interest’ is the one
who, under the applicable substantive law, . . . is the party
entitled to bring suit.” In re Comcoach Corp., 698 F.2d 571, 573
(2d Cir. 1983).
In this case, Bonhomme clearly satisfies the real party
requirement and this Court should reverse the district court for
two reasons. First, Bonhomme has a significant personal interest
in the water quality of Wildman Marsh and the Clean Water Act
grants him a substantive cause of action to enforce effluent
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standards. Second, the district court dismissed Bonhomme’s case
just because a different entity might gain a tertiary benefit
through his success, which is not part of the Rule 17 inquiry.
To the first point, Bonhomme alleges that arsenic from
Maleau’s land pollutes Reedy Creek and Wildman Marsh. R. at 6.
The pollution significantly impairs Bonhomme’s use of the Marsh;
he decreased his yearly hunting trips by seventy-five percent as a
direct result. See r. at 6. These allegations, taken as true, more
than satisfy any necessary showing that Bonhomme “has a
significant interest in the particular action.” Conkright, 535 F.3d
at 120. Cf. Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc. v. Hollander, 337 F.3d 186,
193 (2d Cir. 2003) (suffering a “pecuniary loss” makes one a real
party in interest); Wilderness Soc. v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding a company with financial interests at
stake “unquestionably was a major and real party at interest”).
Bonhomme’s case also satisfies the other interrelated element of
Rule 17—the Clean Water Act’s citizen suit provision grants
Bonhomme the substantive right to seek judicial enforcement
against polluters that discharge without a permit. Indeed, the
CWA specifically authorizes Bonhomme to file “a civil action on
his own behalf” because he is adversely affected by the arsenic
pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (emphasis added).
The second reason this Court must reverse relates to the
district court’s flawed preference for one party over another—
”PMI rather than Bonhomme is the real party in interest.” R. at
8. This reasoning contains a fatal flaw—the trial court assumed
that there can be only one real party in interest. However, that
assumption finds no support. Being a real party in interest does
not exclude others from also being so interested. PrevorMayorsohn Caribbean, Inc. v. P.R. Marine Mgmt., Inc., 620 F.2d
1, 4 (1st Cir. 1980) (“it is not necessary that there always be only
one real party in interest”). See also Wilderness Soc., 495 F.2d at
1036 (finding that both a private company and the federal
government were real parties in interest). Further, other civil
procedure rules, such as those governing intervention and
joinder, expressly recognize that multiple parties may
simultaneously hold an interest in particular litigation. E.g., Fed.
R. Civ. P. 18, 19, 24.
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Additionally, the district court incorrectly emphasized PMI’s
potential benefit from the litigation as a reason to bar
Bonhomme’s suit. R. at 7. Just because “[PMI] is in direct
competition with Maleau” does not mean that Bonhomme is not a
real party in interest. R. at 7. The fact that another party might
benefit is irrelevant to the Rule 17 question. “The real party in
interest is . . . not necessarily the person who will ultimately
benefit from the [suit].” Farrell Constr. Co. v. Jefferson Parish,
La., 896 F.2d 136, 140 (5th Cir. 1990). And that makes sense. In
fact, the very nature of a citizen suit expects that others benefit
when individuals act as private attorneys general. Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that
“citizens [are] performing a public service” when they “bring[]
legitimate actions under this section”).
Even if these reasons did not compel this Court to reverse,
Rule 17 itself allows Bonhomme to sue on behalf of PMI. Rule 17
provides a non-exclusive list of people that “may sue in their own
names without joining the person for whose benefit the action is
brought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1); Farrell Constr., 896 F.2d at 141
(“Rule 17(a)’s list is descriptive, not exclusive”). Among those
exceptions, Rule 17 lists “an administrator” at subsection
(a)(1)(B). An administrator is a “person who manages or heads a
business.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Because he is
the president of the company, Bonhomme can bring a suit that
benefits PMI under his own name.
In sum, the CWA is substantive law and its citizen suit
provision grants Bonhomme a cause of action. This makes him a
de facto real party in interest. The district court improperly
dismissed Bonhomme’s suit simply because it determined that
PMI was a more interested party. This Court should reverse and
remand.
III. BOTH AGENCY REGULATION AND RELEVANT
CASE LAW ESTABLISH THAT REEDY CREEK IS
A “NAVIGABLE WATER” UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT.
Considering the facts at bar, Reedy Creek is a “navigable
water” within the CWA’s reach because of its interstate flow and
impacts on interstate commerce. There is no “single definitive
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test” for determining navigability, and this ultimate
determination “involve[s] questions of law inseparable from the
particular facts to which they are applied.” United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404 (1940). Under
current law, a “navigable water” subject to the Act is one that is
navigable-in-fact, crosses state lines, or is tributary to water that
is either of the former. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715, 742 (2006); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, Draft Guidance on Identifying Waters Protected by the
Clean Water Act 7, 11 (Apr. 27, 2011) [hereinafter 2011
Guidance], available at http://perma.cc/0yfV1i6VbJJ, attached at
App’x C. Here, the district court’s application of law to fact led to
a correct finding of navigability because EPA regulation, relevant
case law, and the Commerce Clause all compel a finding that the
Creek is a “navigable water.”
A. Because Reedy Creek flows across state borders and
draws significant revenue from out-of-state hunters,
the Creek falls within two regulatory definitions of
“waters of the United States.”
Historic use of a water body for commerce and travel is not
the sole test to determine “navigable waters.” Under the CWA,
regulatory definitions, and agency guidance, Reedy Creek is
subject to federal oversight. The CWA defines “navigable waters”
as “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” 33
U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006). Although courts traditionally used the
“navigable in fact” test† to determine which waters were subject
to federal control under the commerce clause, subsequent case
law confirms that “the meaning of ‘navigable waters’ [in the
CWA] . . . is broader than the traditional understanding of the
term.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 73; see also United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) (“Congress chose
to define the waters covered by the [CWA] broadly . . . ‘navigable’
as used in the Act is of limited import.”). Considering the
“hopelessly indeterminate” reach of the CWA, see Sackett v. EPA,
†. Navigable in fact are those waters that are “used or are susceptible of
being used” as highways for commerce and travel. Appalachian Elec. Power, 311
U.S. at 406 n.21.
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132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring), EPA
promulgated a regulation to clarify the Act’s jurisdiction. As set
forth in Part 122.2, “waters of the United States” includes, (1) all
interstate waters and (2) all other waters, including wholly
intrastate water bodies, “the degradation or destruction of which”
could impact interstate commerce. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2013). The
latter category explicitly includes any such waters used by
interstate travelers for recreation. Id. Reedy Creek falls within
both of these categories.
First, Reedy Creek is a water of the United States because it
meets the unambiguous “interstate waters” provision. Recent
agency guidance defines “interstate waters” as those that “flow
across, or form a part of, State boundaries.” 2011 Guidance at 7.
Starting in the State of New Union, Reedy Creek flows for
approximately fifty miles before it terminates in Wildman Marsh,
located in the State of Progress. R. at 5. Because the Reedy begins
in one state and crosses into another, it is squarely within the
regulatory definition of “interstate waters.”
Second, the “use, degradation, or destruction” of Reedy Creek
affects interstate commerce and recreation, which subjects it to
CWA regulation. 40 C.F.R. §122.2. Indeed, wholly intrastate
waters still fall under CWA jurisdiction if they have an
“interstate impact.” United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599
F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1979); see also Utah v. Marsh,740 F.2d
799, 802–04 (10th Cir.1984) (holding the wholly intrastate Utah
Lake to be a “water of the United States” because it was used to
irrigate crops, support a fishery that marketed its fish out-ofstate, and offered recreational opportunities). In Earth Sciences,
the Tenth Circuit held that even though Rito Seco Creek was
located entirely within the state of Colorado, it was nonetheless
subject to CWA provisions because of the stream’s “interstate
impact.” Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 375. These interstate
impacts included waterborne recreation and the use of Rito Seco
for irrigation to grow crops sold in interstate commerce. Id.
Considering the similarities between Reedy Creek and Rito
Seco Creek, the Reedy falls well within EPA’s definition of
“waters of the United States.” Like Rito Seco Creek, the Reedy
supplies the water needed to grow crops that are sold in
interstate markets. R. at 5. Additionally, the Creek and Wildman
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Marsh are a major destination for local, interstate, and foreign
duck hunters. See r. at 6. Indeed, out-of-state hunters contribute
over $25 million to the local economy. R. at 6. The Reedy has an
added connection to interstate commerce beyond those of Rito
Seco: it provides water to Bounty Plaza, a service area on a
federally-funded interstate highway, which encourages interstate
travel. See r. at 5.
While the district court recognized that Earth Sciences would
otherwise control, it stated that the case is no longer good law in
the wake of Rapanos. R. at 10. But, the Rapanos Court did not
directly address the validity of Earth Sciences, nor did it discuss
the extent of the impact on commerce required to bring an
intrastate water under CWA jurisdiction. Therefore, Rapanos did
not invalidate Earth Sciences. Because Reedy Creek is both an
interstate stream and has more interstate impact than Rito Seco
Creek, the Reedy is a water of the United States under Part 122.2
and this Court should affirm.
B. In the alternative, Reedy Creek is a water of the
United States because it is a tributary of Wildman
National Wildlife Refuge.
Even if Reedy Creek was not a “navigable water” in its own
right, the fact that the Creek flows into Wildman National
Wildlife Refuge puts the Creek within the purview of the CWA.
As the district court acknowledges, the plain meaning of “waters
of the United States” encompasses waters under federal
ownership. R. at 10. The government “doubtless has a power over
its own property analogous to the police power of the several
states.” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539–40 (1976).
Indeed, Congress’s ability to “make all needful rules and
regulations respecting . . . the property of the United States” is an
enumerated constitutional power. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Because the Refuge is federally owned it is a “navigable water”
for the purposes of the Act. R. at 10.
According to Part 122.2, “waters of the United States” also
includes tributaries of covered waters. In the CWA context,
“tributary” refers to any watercourse, whether man-made or
natural, that “contributes flow to a traditional navigable water or
interstate water, either directly or indirectly . . . .” 40 C.F.R. §
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122.2; 2011 Guidance at 11. Reedy Creek terminates in, and
empties its flow directly into, Wildman Marsh, which is
encompassed within the Reserve. R. at 5. Because the Marsh is
federally owned, it is a “navigable water” and Reedy Creek is
clearly a tributary to a “water of the United States.” Therefore,
the district court correctly determined that the Reedy is a
navigable water subject to the CWA.
C. Regulating pollution in Reedy Creek is a
permissible exercise of Congress’s Commerce
Clause power because the Creek is an interstate
waterway with impacts on interstate commerce.
Because Reedy Creek is an interstate water body that draws
a large number of waterborne recreators and is a crucial link to
providing goods sold in interstate commerce, Congress can
regulate it under the Commerce Clause. The Constitution grants
specific powers to Congress, one of which is the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Today, the Supreme Court
recognizes three broad categories that Congress can regulate
pursuant to this power: the use of channels of interstate
commerce; the instrumentalities, persons, or things of interstate
commerce; and activities that have a significant relation to
interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–
59 (1995). In essence, Congress has vast regulatory power under
the commerce clause. Id. at 553.
When Congress enacts laws that regulate channels of
interstate commerce—the first prong articulated in Lopez—it has
the power to protect the flow of commerce, not just the economic
activity that occurs within the channels. United States v. Deaton,
332 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Appalachian Elec.
Power, 311 U.S. at 404–05 (“Congress may keep the ‘navigable
waters of the United States’ open and free and provide by
sanctions against any interference with the country’s water
assets.”). Courts also recognize that the ability to regulate the
flow of commerce enables Congress to pass laws that keep
interstate channels “free from immoral and injurious uses.” See
Deaton, 332 F.3d at 706 (listing cases in which courts have
upheld laws enacted to avoid such injurious uses). The power of
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the CWA is couched in the first prong of Lopez because navigable
waters are channels of interstate commerce. See id. (“Congress
enacted the Clean Water Act under ‘its traditional jurisdiction
over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which
could reasonably be so made.’”) (quoting Solid Waste Agency v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001)).
As established above, Reedy Creek is a navigable water
because it flows between two states, which makes it an interstate
channel subject to regulation under the first prong of Lopez. The
Creek is also subject to regulation under the second Lopez prong
because it affects goods sold in interstate commerce as well as
interstate recreation and travel. What’s more, Maleau’s actions
degrade this interstate waterway. See Issues 0–0, infra.
Considering Congress’s ability regulate injurious uses of
interstate commerce channels, extending CWA jurisdiction over
Reedy Creek is a permissible exercise of the commerce clause
power. This Court should affirm.

IV. DITCH C-1 IS A “WATER OF THE UNITED
STATES” BECAUSE IT IS RELATIVELY
PERMANENT AND HAS A SIGNIFICANT NEXUS
WITH REEDY CREEK.
Ditch C-1’s size, flow, and history, taken with relevant case
law, regulations, and agency guidance, compel a finding that the
Ditch is a navigable water under the CWA, not a point source.
The district court incorrectly stated that Rapanos definitively
stands for the proposition that ditches cannot be “navigable
waters” because “ditch” is mentioned in the CWA definition of
“point source.” R. at 9 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 735–36, and
CWA section 502(14)). Rapanos made no such finding. To the
contrary, rather than draw definitive lines as to what constitutes
a “water of the United States,” the Rapanos decision further
“mudd[ied] the jurisdictional waters.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 800
(Stevens, J., dissenting). When analyzed under Rapanos, the facts
in this case show that Ditch C-1 fits within the statutory
definition of “navigable waters.”
“The reach of the Clean Water Act is notoriously unclear,”
Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J.,
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concurring), and the Supreme Court has addressed the scope of
“navigable waters” subject to the CWA on three occasions. First,
in Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court upheld the Army Corps’s
determination that the CWA covered freshwater wetlands
adjacent to navigable and interstate waters and their tributaries.
474U.S. 121, 139 (1985). Next, in Solid Waste Agency, the
Supreme Court invalidated the Corps’s “Migratory Bird Rule,”
which previously allowed the Corps to extend CWA jurisdiction
over any water body, even unconnected, intrastate waters, on the
sole basis that it provided migratory bird habitat. 531 U.S. at
172. Most recently, the Court issued its Rapanos decision that
again addressed whether particular wetlands were within CWA
jurisdiction. 547 U.S. at 729. To answer that question, the Court
had to determine when a “tributary” is a “water of the United
States.” Id. at 742. While five justices concurred in judgment, a
majority did not agree on a standard for such waters. See id. at
758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
As described in the following sections, two tests to determine
CWA jurisdiction emerged from Rapanos: (A) the plurality’s
“relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing” test;
and (B) Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test. See id. at 739,
779. Because neither received support from a majority of the
justices, Rapanos did not establish a definitive standard for
determining the reach of the CWA. “When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys
the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position’” that least restricts federal jurisdiction.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quotation
omitted); United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 180 (3rd Cir.
2011).
In the wake of Rapanos, federal courts split on which test
reflects the “narrowest grounds.” Donovan, 661 F.3d at 180. The
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that Justice
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test alone is the measure of CWA
jurisdiction. See United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc.,464 F.3d
723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2006); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of
Healdsburg,496 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2007). The First,
Third, and Fourth Circuits, as well as the federal government,
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have determined that, if either the plurality test or Kennedy’s
significant nexus test is met, the water body falls within the CWA
regulatory scheme. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64
(1st Cir. 2006); Donovan, 661 F.3d at 180–84; Deerfield
Plantation Phase II-B Prop. Owners Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 501 F. App’x 268 (4th Cir. 2012); 2011 Guidance at 2. On
the other hand, no circuit has found that only the plurality’s
“relatively permanent, constantly flowing” test applies.
This Court need not decide which test to adopt because Ditch
C-1 is subject to CWA regulation under both: (A) the plurality
standard and (B) the substantial nexus test; and also (C) because
the CWA’s policy goals contemplate control over waters like Ditch
C-1.
A. Ditch C-1 is a “water of the United States” because
it is a relatively permanent and continuously
flowing body of water.
Despite the fact that Ditch C-1 is a man-made feature, its
constant existence over the past 100 years and continuous flow
during at least nine months out of every year mean that the Ditch
falls under CWA jurisdiction. The plurality test in Rapanos holds
that only relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing
bodies of water are “waters of the United States.” 547 U.S. at 739.
Further, those waters must be “continuously present, fixed bodies
of water as opposed to dry channels through which water
occasionally flows,” and, at minimum, exhibit “continuous flow in
a permanent channel.” Id. at 733. Under this test, the CWA does
not extend to watercourses through which water flows “only
intermittently or ephemerally.” Id. at 739. While Justice Scalia
mentions that “ditch” is included in the Act as an example of a
point source because the term implies intermittence, id. at 736,
the ultimate determination of Clean Water Act jurisdiction is
fact-dependent. Id. at 732 n.5; id. at 736 n.7.
For instance, a court recently employed this fact-dependent
inquiry when it found that a seasonal canal was subject to the
CWA. United States v. Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Idaho
2011). In Vierstra, Low Line Canal fell under CWA jurisdiction
even though it was man-made, lacked an interstate connection,
and flowed only seasonally. Id. at 1167. The Canal carried water
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continuously during the six-to-eight month irrigation season. Id.
at 1169. It discharged into a naturally-occurring stream, which in
turn emptied into the Snake River, a traditionally navigable
water. Id. at 1168–69. On these facts, the court determined that
Low Line Canal was properly deemed a “water of the United
States” as a non-navigable tributary under Part 122.2, as well as
under Rapanos’s plurality and significant nexus tests. Id. at
1169–72.
As in Vierstra, the totality of the facts alleged in this case,
taken as true, show that Ditch C-1 is a relatively permanent
tributary of Reedy Creek that is subject to the CWA. Not only
does Ditch C-1 maintain a continuous flow for a longer period
than Low Line Canal—a minimum of nine months versus a
maximum of eight—the Ditch is also supplied by a more
permanent water source, groundwater. R. at 5. Running water
has passed through the Ditch since 1913, and it will continue to
do so because restrictive property covenants ensure its existence
and maintenance. R. at 5. Furthermore, Ditch C-1 flows directly
into Reed Creek, r. at 5, making it a direct tributary of a
navigable water as opposed to the more attenuated connection in
Vierstra. Thus, Ditch C-1 is more clearly a “water of the United
States” than Low Line Canal, which also satisfied Rapanos’s factspecific inquiry.
EPA’s position on regulating tributaries under the Rapanos
plurality test also supports finding CWA jurisdiction over Ditch
C-1. To be a tributary, a water body must have a bed, bank,
ordinary high water mark, and one of five additional qualities.
2011 Guidance at 12. Ditch C-1 has defined measurements, r. at.
5, which suggests that it meets the first three requirements or, at
minimum, requires additional fact-finding. It also exhibits
“relatively permanent flowing water,” one of the five additional
qualities under the Guidance. The Ditch is therefore within EPA’s
definition of tributary. Furthermore, the Ditch connects directly
to Reedy Creek, r. at 5, and is therefore a jurisdictional, nonnavigable tributary. 2011 Guidance at 13.
The Rapanos plurality admits that ditches can hold water
permanently as well as intermittently, but when they do we call
them by another name, such as “moat” or “canal.” Rapanos, 547
U.S. at 736 n.7. In light of this language, the characteristics of a
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particular water body, not the title attached to it, determine
whether it falls under the CWA. As Chief Justice Roberts stated,
“[l]ower courts and regulated entities will now have to feel their
way on a case-by-case basis” to determine whether a water body
is protected by the CWA. Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Because Ditch C-1 is a tributary to Reedy Creek and is relatively
permanent, both in flow and in existence, the Ditch is properly
classified as a “water of the United States.”
B. Ditch C-1 is a “water of the United States” because
it substantially affects the chemical and biological
integrity of Reedy Creek.
The pattern of measured arsenic concentrations in Ditch C-1
and Reedy Creek shows the “significant nexus” between the two
and brings the Ditch within the CWA. Drawing on the Supreme
Court decisions in Riverside Bayview Homes and Solid Waste
Agency, Justice Kennedy’s jurisdictional test asks if a nonnavigable tributary has a “significant nexus” with a traditionally
navigable water. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 778–80 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Stated differently, the CWA applies even to nonnavigable waters if the non-navigable water “significantly
affect[s] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of a
traditionally navigable water. Id. at 780. Under this test, it does
not matter if the “significant effect” results from the water’s
direct connection to the navigable water or through a tributary
system. Id.
EPA and the Corps use the significant nexus test to
determine jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries that are not
relatively permanent. 2011 Guidance at 13. The Guidance
describes non-navigable tributaries as natural or man-made
water bodies with defined beds and banks that “contribute[] flow
to a traditional navigable [] or interstate water, either directly or
indirectly by means of other tributaries.” Id. at 11. When
engaging in the significant nexus analysis, the agencies consider
a variety of factors including: flow characteristics, proximity to a
traditional navigable water, physical characteristics of the
tributary, capacity to carry pollutants, and other hydrological
factors the agencies deem relevant. Id. at 11. While courts are not
bound to adhere to the Guidance, EPA’s interpretations of
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relevant law are entitled to deference to the extent they have the
“power to persuade.” Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Skidmore
deference).
The significant nexus test is also a fact-specific analysis. See
Deerfield Plantation Phase II-B Prop. Owners Ass’n v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 801 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (D.S.C. 2011) (applying
EPA CWA jurisdictional guidance from 2008 and detailing the
facts the Corps relied upon to make its significant nexus
determination). In Deerfield Plantation, the district court upheld
the Corps’s determination that no significant nexus existed
between the ditches, swales, and ponds at issue in the case. Id. at
465. The structures were designed primarily to retain water and
thus had low volume, duration, and frequency of flow. Id. The
ditches and swales contained significant vegetation and
merely”‘convey[ed] water from ponds and surrounding upland
areas during and following storm events and there [was] no
evidence of groundwater recharge.’” Id. at 456. Furthermore,
none of these features had any direct or indirect connection to a
traditionally navigable water. Id.
The facts of this case distinguish it from Deerfield Plantation.
Unlike the Deerfield ditch, Ditch C-1 is primarily supplied with
groundwater and receives additional flow from storm events. R.
at 5. The Ditch also connects directly to Reedy Creek, a navigable
water in its own right. R. at 5. Most importantly, the pattern of
arsenic concentrations in Ditch C-1 and Reedy Creek shows that
the Ditch has a significant effect on the chemical and biological
integrity of the Creek. Arsenic is undetectable in Ditch C-1 until
just below Maleau’s property. R. at 6. Similarly, the chemical is
only detectable in Reedy Creek at locations downstream from its
confluence with the Ditch. R. at 6. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service also found arsenic in several Blue-winged Teal in
Wildman Marsh. R. at 6. These facts indicate that the Ditch C-1
significantly affects Reedy Creek’s “chemical, physical, and
biological integrity.”
At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege those facts
that, accepted as true, state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face. Bonhomme easily met this burden and plausibly alleges a

23

72 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 5
significant nexus between Ditch C-1 and Reedy Creek that would
bring the Ditch within the purview of the CWA.
C. Exempting Ditch C-1 from Clean Water Act
jurisdiction is contrary to the purpose of the Act.
Both the explicit statutory purpose of the CWA and its
legislative history counsel against exempting Ditch C-1 from
regulation under the Act. As articulated in Section 101, the
objective of the Act is to “restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). This objective is a broad one and takes a
“systematic view of the goal of maintaining and improving water
quality.” Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 132.
To realize this goal, Congress understood it would be
necessary for the Act to reach the widest range of waters
permissible under the Constitution. See Utah v. Marsh,740 F.2d
799, 802 (10th Cir.1984) (“It is generally agreed that Congress, by
adopting this definition, intended to assert federal jurisdiction
over the nation’s waters to the maximum extent permissible
under the Constitution, unlimited by traditional concepts of
navigability”); see also S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236 (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3822, attached at App’x B (specifying
that “[t]he conferees fully intend that the term ‘navigable waters’
be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation
unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made
or may be made for administrative purposes.”). Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized three times that in order to fulfill
its purpose, the CWA must extend to waters that are not
navigable in the traditional sense. See Issue 0, supra. In the
words of the district court, “it would be difficult or impossible to
prevent pollution of a navigable stream without preventing
pollution of its tributaries.” R. at 10. Ditch C-1 is a permanent
and consistently flowing tributary with a significant connection to
navigable waters and federal property reserved for biological
purposes. It is a perfect example of waters not traditionally
navigable, but inextricably linked to maintaining the integrity of
the nation’s waters.
The overwhelming weight of legal authority militates in favor
of finding Ditch C-1 is within the regulatory universe of the Clean
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Water Act. Both Rapanos and subsequent agency guidance
establish that Ditch C-1, despite its name, is actually a
jurisdictional, non-navigable tributary of Reedy Creek.
Furthermore, the same policy considerations that led Congress to
enact the CWA compel this Court to recognize jurisdiction over
the Ditch. Considering the facts and the law applicable here, the
district court was incorrect in concluding that Ditch C-1 is not a
“navigable water” under the CWA. This Court should reverse and
remand for further proceedings.

V. THE PILES OF MINING WASTE THAT MALEAU
DEPOSITED ON HIS PROPERTY ARE POINT
SOURCES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
BECAUSE THEY HAVE DISCRETE CHANNELS
THAT CONVEY POLLUTION INTO DITCH C-1.
Piles of dirt are not always point sources, but that does not
mean that Maleau’s piles of overburden and mine waste cannot
be a point source. The CWA bans “any addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from a point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A)
(emphasis added to the three key elements). Arsenic is a
pollutant and the Ditch is a navigable water. R. at 8; Issue 0,
supra. The crux of this issue is the CWA’s definition of “point
source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance” not
including discharges from agricultural stormwater and return
flows. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
Although the district court determined otherwise, Maleau’s
unpermitted discharges of arsenic from his property into Ditch C1 are unlawful under the CWA because they originate from
discernible, confined and discrete conveyances. As described
below, Bonhomme alleged sufficient facts, taken as true, to make
a plausible showing that Maleau’s piles of mining waste are point
sources that add pollution into Ditch C-1.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court and
remand for proceedings consistent with applicable law for two
reasons. First, Maleau’s piles of mining waste constitute a point
source because rainwater carries pollutants from the piles
through eroded channels into navigable waters. Second, the
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district court relied on inapplicable case law that does not affect
Bonhomme’s argument.
A. Maleau’s piles discharge arsenic through discrete
channels into navigable waters, violating the Clean
Water Act.
An eroded channel counts as a discrete conveyance under the
CWA, but Maleau argues otherwise. He asserts that his piles of
slag and overburden are not point sources because they do not
constitute a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.” R. at
9 (citing Consol. Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 249 (4th Cir.
1979); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th
Cir. 1976)). In its decision the district court agreed, stating that
none of the CWA’s statutory examples “remotely resemble a pile
of dirt and stone,” while adding that “[p]iles are not normally
considered to be conveyances.” R. at 9. But this analysis was not
rigorous enough. Just because piles of mining waste are not
normally considered conveyances does not mean they cannot be
conveyances. See Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41,
45 (5th Cir. 1980).
Under the CWA, a point source is “any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance” such as a channel, conduit, or discrete
fissure, and courts liberally construe the definition. 33 U.S.C. §
1362(14); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373
(10th Cir. 1979) (“a point source . . . embrac[es] the broadest
possible definition of any identifiable conveyance”). Accordingly,
courts have held that the statutory definition of point source
excludes only unchanneled and uncollected surface waters.
Appalachian Power, 545 F.2d at 1373; accord Abston, 620 F.2d at
47. It follows that diffuse surface water becomes a point source
when it channels and collects. See Abston, 620 F.2d at 45. The
waste piles on Maleau’s property fall squarely within the
statutory and court-interpreted definition. Indeed, courts hold
exactly that: piles of mining overburden are point sources when
runoff gathers a pollutant and carries it from the piles through
gullies or other discrete conveyances created by erosion. Id.
In Abston, a coal company placed overburden into spoil piles.
Id. at 43. The piles were highly erodible and rainwater leached
acid from them and carried it into an adjacent stream. Id. The
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district court determined that the piles were not a point source
because the pollution arose from “natural erosion and rainfall.”
Id. at 44. However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed. It reversed and
focused on the “discernible, confined and discrete” language in the
definition of a point source. Id. at 44. The court made it clear that
“[g]ravity flow” is a point source discharge when precipitation
erodes “ditches [or] gullies” in the “spoil pile walls.” Id. at 45.
Further, the piles are point sources “even if the miners have done
nothing beyond the mere collection of rock and other materials.”
Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court in Abston
determined that piles of mining waste constitute a point source if
they discharge pollutants from “discernible, confined, and
discrete conveyance(s),” and are a “component of a mine drainage
system.” Id.
The piles of slag and overburden that Maleau transports to
his property fit precisely into the Abston court’s two-part
definition of point source. First, much like the spoil piles in
Abston, rainwater and gravity eroded channels on and between
Maleau’s waste piles extend all the way to Ditch C-1. R. at 4.
Rainwater flows through these channels and picks up arsenic as
it flows into the Ditch. R. at 5. Thus, Maleau’s piles constitute a
point source because they add arsenic to Ditch C-1 through a
discrete conveyance.
Furthermore, Maleau’s piles constitute a “mine drainage
system” just like the piles in Abston. Although the waste in
Abston was stored on site, the fact that Maleau transported the
waste fifty miles from his mine, r. at 7, is a difference without a
distinction. It is their configuration, not their location, that
makes the piles a mine drainage system. See Abston, 620 F.2d at
45. Accordingly, Maleau cannot escape liability for the arsenic
pollution simply by transporting his mine waste drainage system
from one site to another.
As indicated by the Abston court’s thorough analysis, the
determination of whether or not a waste pile is a conveyance is a
fact-specific inquiry. See Abston, 620 F.2d at 45. Bonhomme’s
complaint alleges more than enough facts to satisfy the Twombly
pleading standard—it claims that Maleau arranged mining waste
on his property such that rainwater runoff from eroded channels
in the piles discharged arsenic into Ditch C-1. R. at 4–5. Based on
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Bonhomme’s complaint and the Abston decision, this Court
should remand for proceedings on the merits.
B. The district court used the wrong case law to
determine that Maleau’s piles do not constitute a
point source under the Act.
The holdings in Consolidation Coal and Appalachian Power
do not mean that the piles of slag and overburden on Maleau’s
property are not point sources under the CWA. In both cases,
industrial petitioners sought judicial review of EPA regulations
promulgated under the CWA, which is not the issue in this case.
Appalachian Power stands for the proposition that EPA, through
rulemaking, cannot exceed the statutory scope of “point source”
intended by Congress. Appalachian Power, 545 F.2d at 1373
(upholding industrial petitioners argument that construction
runoff regulations exceeded the statutory scope of a point source
under the CWA). The holding in Consolidation Coal, on the other
hand, stands for the proposition that, in the absence of an asapplied challenge, courts cannot determine whether EPA
regulations exceed the scope of the statutory definitions. Consol.
Coal Co., 604 F.2d at 249–50 (dispensing with industrial
petitioners facial challenge that EPA regulations could be applied
to surface runoff outside the statutory definition of a point
source).
The district court erroneously relied on these cases as
controlling. Unlike the petitioners in Consolidation Coal and
Appalachian Power, Bonhomme does not argue that an expanded
regulatory definition of a point source applies to the mining waste
piles on Maleau’s property. Rather, Bonhomme seeks to enforce
the CWA’s basic statutory provision banning the discharge of
pollutants without a permit. Accordingly, the holdings in
Consolidation Coal and Appalachian Power are not dispositive
because they analyze regulations, not the underlying statute.
Bonhomme simply argues that Maleau’s piles of slag and
overburden adjacent to Ditch C-1 fit within the statutory
definition of “point source.” Therefore, the holdings of
Consolidation Coal and Appalachian Power do not impact
Bonhomme’s argument.
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In sum, the Abston rule holds that piles of mining waste
constitute a point source when rainwater carries pollutants from
the pile through eroded channels into navigable waters. The
district court erred when it dismissed this issue because
Bonhomme’s complaint contained sufficient factual information to
support a claim for relief under Abston. Finally, even if it could
have reached the merits on a motion to dismiss, the district court
relied on inapplicable cases that do not affect Bonhomme’s
arguments. Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand
for proceedings consistent with appropriate law.
VI. BONHOMME DID NOT VIOLATE THE CLEAN
WATER ACT WHEN ALREADY-POLLUTED
WATER FLOWED THROUGH HIS PROPERTY
INTO REEDY CREEK.
Even though a culvert can be a point source, Bonhomme’s
culvert does not add pollutants to a navigable water because the
arsenic was already in the water. As identified in Issue 0, supra,
Section 301(a) of the CWA bars “the discharge of any pollutant”
without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). To violate the CWA,
Bonhomme must add a pollutant to a navigable water from a
point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(2). Bonhomme concedes that
culverts can be point sources, but his culvert is not because it is
simply a part of Ditch C-1. See Issue 0, supra (showing that the
Ditch is a water of the United States). Thus, this issue turns on
the term “addition,” which the CWA does not define. See id.;
Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210,
1217 (11th Cir. 2009). However, EPA regulations do. National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water
Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,697, 33,701 (June 13, 2008)
[hereinafter Water Transfers Rule Preamble] (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 122.3(i)), attached at App’x D. According to the rule,
“addition” to navigable waters under the CWA does not include
the transfer of pollutants within the same body of navigable
water or between two distinct navigable waters. Id.; 40 C.F.R. §
122.3(i).
The district court failed to acknowledge and apply the Water
Transfers Rule in its decision to dismiss Bonhomme’s suit. Even
in the absence of the Rule, Bonhomme should not face CWA
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liability based solely on the fact that a culvert under his property
carries arsenic from Maleau’s waste piles into Reedy Creek. This
Court should reverse the lower court and remand with
instructions to apply the Water Transfers Rule because: (A) the
Water Transfers Rule is the applicable law; (B) the Rule properly
assigns CWA responsibility; and (C) public policy supports
assigning responsibility to Maleau.
A. The district court applied the wrong law to
determine that transfer of water through
Bonhomme’s culvert into Reedy Creek constitutes
an unlawful addition of pollutants under the CWA.
Both of the cases that the district court applied do not control
here because the Water Transfers Rule superseded them. R. at 9
(citing S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
541 U.S. 95, 105 (2004); and Dague v. Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343,
13154–55 (2d Cir. 1991)). EPA’s definition of “addition” in the
Water Transfers Rule arises from two interrelated theories in
CWA jurisprudence: the “outside world” and “unitary waters”
theories. See Water Transfers Rule Preamble, 73 Fed. Reg.
33,697. This new definition changes the playing field.
Under the outside world theory, an “addition” only occurs the
first time a point source “introduce[s] the pollutant into navigable
water from the outside world.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch,
693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). In Gorsuch,
the D.C. Circuit grappled with whether pollution flowing through
a dam constituted an “addition” of pollutants. Id. The court
determined that addition does not occur when pollution “merely
passes . . . from one body of navigable water (the reservoir) into
another (the downstream river).” Id. In other words, “addition
from a point source occurs only if the point source itself physically
introduces a pollutant into water from the outside world.” Id. at
175.
Other courts follow Gorsuch’s outside world reasoning. For
instance, the Supreme Court explained the theory using a simple
analogy: “[i]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the
pot, and pours it back into the pot, one has not added soup or
anything else to the pot.” Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. at
110 (quotation omitted). Therefore, “addition” only occurs when a
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point source introduces a pollutant into a navigable water from
the outside world.
The second piece of jurisprudence that EPA incorporated into
the Water Transfers Rule is the unitary waters theory, which
extends the outside world theory. Under it, an addition of
pollutants to navigable waters cannot occur when pollutants
move from one navigable water body to another. Friends of
Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1217. Therefore, an addition occurs “only
when pollutants first enter navigable waters from a point source,
not when they are moved between navigable waters.” Id. The
approach taken by EPA under the Water Transfers Rule makes
sense. But for the unitary waters theory, a discrete addition of
pollution could give rise to multiple violations as it made its way
from source to sea. Rather than requiring a series of permits for a
single source of pollution, it is more efficient to require a permit
when the pollution first reaches navigable waters—it can be more
easily reduced or remediated there.
To be fair, the circuit courts generally disapproved of the
unitary waters theory before EPA promulgated the recent Water
Transfers Rule. E.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2002); Catskill Mountains
Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d
481, 491–93 (2nd Cir. 2001). However, EPA’s promulgation of the
Rule in 2008 resolved the disapproval in Bonhomme’s favor.
Indeed, Friends of Everglades remains the only direct appellate
review of the Rule, which it expressly upheld. 570 F.3d at 1228
(“EPA’s regulation adopting the unitary waters theory is a
reasonable . . . construction of the [statute].”).
The key distinction here is that the earlier courts rejecting
the unitary waters theory were reviewing EPA actions before any
rulemaking took place. Id. at 1218. As such, the agency received
no Chevron deference towards its enforcement actions. Id. Now,
the agency has promulgated a rule and is therefore entitled to
Chevron deference regarding its interpretation. Id. The Water
Transfers Rule is now the law of the land. It is supported both by
EPA’s expertise in water pollution regulation as well as the
common sense notion that pollution should be subject to
permitting when it enters navigable waters, not at each transfer
between navigable water bodies.
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A federal court of appeals has also upheld the Water
Transfers Rule. As identified by the Eleventh Circuit, Chevron
deference applies to the Water Transfers Rule because EPA is the
agency charged with granting and enforcing NPDES permits
under the CWA, and because the term “addition” in section
1362(2) of the Clean Water Act is ambiguous. Id. at 1227 (noting
that EPA chose one of the two reasonable interpretations of
“addition”). EPA’s construction of “addition” is a reasonable one;
it therefore cannot be “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.” Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the unitary waters
theory. Id. at 1228. Rather than rely on outdated case law,
Bonhomme asks this Court to apply the Water Transfer Rule and
determine that the culvert on his property does not constitute an
addition of pollutants to navigable waters.
B. Under the Water Transfers Rule, addition of a
pollutant can only occur once—Bonhomme cannot
be liable for adding arsenic again.
Because Maleau already added arsenic from his piles into the
Ditch, Bonhomme cannot re-add it to Reedy Creek through his
culvert. This follows from applying both of the theories that form
EPA’s definition of “addition” under the Water Transfers Rule.
First, the outside world theory dictates that an addition of
pollutants can only occur from an outside point source. Gorsuch,
693 F.2d at 175; Water Transfers Rule Preamble, 73 Fed. Reg. at
33,701. Second, the unitary waters theory means that an addition
cannot occur when pollutants are transferred from one navigable
water body into another. Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1217;
Water Transfers Rule Preamble, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,701 (citing
EPA’s “long-standing practice of generally not requiring NPDES
permits for transfers between [navigable] water bodies”).
As identified in Issue 0, supra, Ditch C-1 is a navigable water
body because it is a tributary to the Reedy, which is itself
navigable. R. at 10. The Water Transfers Rule defines a water
transfer as, “an activity that conveys or connects waters of the
United States without subjecting the transferred water to
intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial use.” 40 C.F.R. §
122.3(i). Thus, under the Rule, addition from a point source to
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navigable waters only occurs when rainwater flows through the
eroded channels in Maleau’s waste piles and into Ditch C-1.
Accordingly, the logic of the outside world theory dictates that the
addition of arsenic from a point source—the piles of mining
waste—into a navigable water body—Ditch C-1—precludes
holding Bonhomme liable when the arsenic flows through his
culvert into Reedy Creek.
Under the unitary waters theory, Bonhomme cannot add
pollutants from Ditch C-1 into Reedy Creek through the culvert
because both bodies are navigable. The facts in this case are
analogous to the hypothetical situation used by the Eleventh
Circuit to explain the unitary waters theory. Friends of
Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1228. In the hypothetical, two buckets sit
side by side. One bucket holds four marbles; the other holds none.
A rule prohibits “any addition of any marbles to buckets by any
person.” Id. If a person takes two marbles from the first bucket
and places them in the second bucket, did they “add” any marbles
in violation of the rule? No. Id. Under the Water Transfers Rule,
there were four marbles in buckets to begin with, and there are
still four marbles in buckets after the transfer. No addition of
marbles occurred. Id.
Just like the marble hypothetical, no addition of pollutants
between Ditch C-1 and Reedy Creek occurred in this case. Arsenic
already present in the Ditch passively transfers between
navigable water bodies when it flows through the culvert into the
Reedy. Therefore, under EPA’s interpretation of the Water
Transfers Rule, upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in Friends of
Everglades, enforcement of the CWA must occur on Maleau’s
property where his waste piles add arsenic to the Ditch, not at
the culvert on Bonhomme’s property where water transfers into
Reedy Creek.
C. Public policy also supports regulating the pollution
at Maleau’s source piles, not where it transfers from
one water of the United States to another.
Public policy and federalism both favor enforcing the CWA at
the pollution’s source rather than where Ditch C-1 and the Reedy
converge. However, the district court violated both concepts when
it held Bonhomme liable for Maleau’s arsenic. First, classic
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principles of federalism prevent the federal government from
interfering with the states’ primary authority to manage water
transfers within their own boundaries. Second, general notions of
fairness and legislative history favor CWA enforcement where
Maleau’s arsenic enters Ditch C-1, not downstream where the
Ditch reaches a confluence with Reedy Creek.
To the first point, the Water Transfers Rule exempts water
transfer points from permitting, which makes sense under
traditional notions of federalism. “Water transfers are an
essential component of the nation’s infrastructure for delivering
water that users are entitled to receive under State law.” Water
Transfers Rule Preamble, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,702 (emphasis
added). Congress agrees, acknowledging the importance of water
allocation under state water law: “[i]t is the policy of Congress
that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water
within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or
otherwise impaired by [the CWA].” 33 U.S.C. § 1251. To that end,
the power to allocate water to their citizens rests almost
exclusively with the states. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2) (2006). Justice
Scalia also articulates the federalism concerns associated with
state control over regulation in Rapanos, arguing “[w]e ordinarily
expect a ‘clear and manifest’ statement from Congress to
authorize an unprecedented intrusion into traditional state
authority.” Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006).
Because the CWA does not contain a “clear and manifest” intent
from Congress to invade traditional state spheres of control, EPA
cannot rely on the ambiguity of the word “addition” to take
regulation of water transfers away from states.
On the second point, general notions of fairness also support
the determination that the CWA should be enforced at the piles of
mining waste rather than at the culvert leading into Reedy
Creek. In 1972 when Congress passed the CWA, it specifically
targeted point source discharges, not water transfers. S. Rep. No.
92-414 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742 (“it is
essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the
source”). The Water Transfers Rule Preamble explains why:
“Rather than discharg[ing] effluent, water transfers convey one
water of the U.S. into another.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,702.
Essentially, a water transfer just moves water; operators of
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transfer facilities, like Bonhomme and his culvert, cannot control
the upstream addition of pollutants in the waters they convey. Id.
Both Congress’s language and the Water Transfers Rule
Preamble recognize that it is more efficient and effective to
control water pollution at the source of effluent, rather than at
water transfer points occurring miles downstream.
The district court contradicted that principle though, and
assigned liability not to the source of the arsenic pollution, but to
a downstream party that neither actually nor proximately caused
it. Bonhomme’s only so-called fault in this case revolves around
his property’s unfortunate geographic location. Regulating the
arsenic at its source—Maleau’s waste piles—fits precisely within
Congress’s CWA policy choice. Regulating the arsenic at
Bonhomme’s culvert does not.
In sum, the transfer of water from Ditch C-1 into Reedy
Creek through Bonhomme’s culvert does not violate the CWA.
Under the Water Transfers Rule, the term “addition” excludes
transfers of water from one body to another. The CWA’s
language, as well as its legislative history, support the same
conclusion—punishing Bonhomme for Maleau’s pollution is
unfair in these circumstances and violates principles of
federalism. The district court, however, applied outdated law and
ignored the Water Transfers Rule when it determined the
opposite. This Court should reverse and remand.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Bonhomme asks this Court to affirm
the district court on one issue: Reedy Creek is a “navigable water”
under the Clean Water Act. However, the district court erred on
the other five issues: Bonhomme’s French nationality does not bar
his suit; he is a real party in interest to the litigation; Ditch C-1 is
also a water of the United States; Maleau’s waste piles are point
sources; and Bonhomme’s culvert is not. These issues require
expansive legal analysis and fact-specific inquiries that the lower
court failed to address, making the district court’s grant of
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Maleau’s motion to dismiss inappropriate. This Court should
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with the
applicable law outlined above.
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